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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper utilizes a unique comprehensive dataset, drawn from the 1999 baseline survey of 
some 2000 micro and small-scale enterprises (MSEs) in Kenya.   We analyse the financing 
behaviour of these enterprises within the framework of a heterodox model of debt-equity and 
gearing decisions.  We also study determinants of the success rate of loan applications.  Our 
results emphasize three major findings.  First, MSEs in Kenya obtain debt from a wide variety 
of sources.  Second, debt-equity and gearing decisions by MSEs and their success rates in loan 
applications can all be understood by relatively simple models which include a mixture of 
conventional and heterodox variables.  Third, and in particular, measures of the tangibility of 
the owner's assets, and the owner's education and training have a significant positive impact on 
the probability of borrowing and of the gearing level.  These findings have important policy 
implications for policy-makers and entrepreneurs of MSEs in Kenya. 
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1. Introduction 
Considerable attention has been paid in the last decade to the problem of poverty-reduction in 
developing countries.  (World Bank, 1989, 1997)  It is generally agreed that the development 
of micro and small scale enterprises (MSEs) can be a key ingredient in poverty-reduction (Sen, 
1980).  However, MSEs generally suffer from a range of problems in their establishment and 
development.  Among these problems, we would argue that finance is perhaps the most central.  
A recent World Bank study found that about 90 per cent of small enterprises surveyed stated 
that credit was a major constraint to new investment (Parker, Riopelle and Steel, 1995).  A 
priori, it might seem surprising that finance should be so important.  Requirements such as 
identifying a product and a market, acquiring any necessary property rights or licenses, and 
keeping proper records are all in some sense more fundamental to running a small enterprise 
than is finance.  However, potential providers of finance, whether formal or informal, are 
unlikely to commit funds to a business which they view as not being on a sound footing, 
irrespective of the exact nature of the unsoundness.  Lack of funds may therefore be the 
immediate reason for a business failing to start or to progress, even when the more fundamental 
reason lies elsewhere.  In this sense therefore, we would argue that finance is the "glue" that 
holds together all the diverse aspects involved in a small business start-up and development. 
Cook and Nixson (2000) have recently surveyed the literature on finance for MSEs.  They 
observe that most extant research on MSEs is concerned with the industrial countries.  There is 
much less literature on developing countries, in part because basic data availability is much 
sparser.  They identify several key research questions which require investigation.  Among 
these they particularly note that little is known about the relationships between the financing of 
MSEs and their ownership characteristics, size, and performance. 
In this paper we take up the question of how finance is related to other aspects of small 
business.  Specifically, we study the determinants of probably the most important financial 
decision of MSEs, that of how to raise capital for the business, distinguishing between the 
initial capital and any follow-up capital acquired for expansion or restructuring.  We examine 
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this decision in the context of a large sample of MSEs in Kenya.  Kenya's small enterprise 
sector forms an important part of the economy and available data suggests that, in the recent 
past, it has grown faster than the larger organized sector (Aboagye, 1986).  Moreover, small 
enterprises tend to be more labour-intensive than large enterprises (Snodgrass and Biggs, 
1995).  Thus, a lot is expected of Kenya’s MSEs in the fight against poverty and there is 
considerable interest in research that can enlarge the pool of information to help inform policy 
towards MSEs.  More precisely, in our research, we seek to identify first, the factors which 
lead Kenyan MSEs to borrow, whether from formal or informal sources, as against using 
equity; second, the determinants of the gearing rate which they actually employ; and third, the 
determinants of their success rate in applying for loans. 
To analyse the financing behaviour of small enterprises in Kenya we set up and test an eclectic 
but heterodox empirical model of the capital structure and financial decisions of MSEs.  The 
model is heterodox because it includes a wide range of variables not typically included in 
conventional financial models.  See Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001) for a survey of such 
conventional models.  In the first part of the analysis, we use the full sample of firms in our 
dataset to investigate the determinants of MSEs' debt-equity decisions, which we study using a 
binary choice model.  We hypothesize that heterodox factors will be important in determining 
whether or not MSEs are able to get a loan to start up their business, and further that heterodox 
factors may decrease in importance as the business gets established and seeks further capital.  
Heterodox factors include inter alia variables representing ownership, the market, and the 
education, property rights and book-keeping skills of the owners and managers.  Thus the 
analysis also explores the relationship between the "glue" of finance and the component parts 
of the businesses which we conjecture are held together by this glue. 
In the second part of the analysis we use the full sample of data to examine the determinants of 
gearing, ie. the ratio of outstanding debt to debt-plus-equity.  In theory, we would expect these 
determinants to be broadly similar to those of the gearing decisions for initial and additional 
capital examined in the first part of the analysis. 
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Third, we turn more specifically to debt decisions.  It transpires that only a small number of 
MSEs in the dataset (exactly 100) did in fact apply for a loan to finance their capital in the 
recent past.  We therefore study this sub-sample directly, and model the determinants of the 
"success rate" in the debt market, ie. the ratio of the loan received by a firm to the amount for 
which it applied1. 
Our dataset permits a much broader analysis of these issues than is usually possible.  We rely 
on a unique comprehensive dataset, which contains a vast amount of information about the 
financing behaviour of MSEs in Kenya.   Drawn from the 1999 baseline survey of MSEs in 
Kenya,  the dataset consists of 2000 businesses, which form the basis for the analysis reported 
in this paper.  The data, which we describe in more detail below, consist of answers to a wide 
range of qualitative and quantitative questions put to MSEs during 1999.  The data do not 
include detailed accounting information, but they do include numerous other indicators of the 
nature of each business and its financial, operating, and ownership characteristics. 
In summary, this paper includes a number of important innovations.  First, in the dataset we 
use; second, in the application of a heterodox model of financial decisions; third, in the 
examination of the differences in decision-making between new and established businesses; 
and fourth, in a systematic study of the determinants of the success rates of loan applications 
by small  businesses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we briefly describe the MSE sector 
in Kenya and the survey data which we use in our analysis.  Section 3 sets out the model and 
the empirical methods we use to analyse these data.  Section 4 contains the main empirical 
results.  Concluding remarks appear in section 5. 
2. Kenya's Micro and Small Enterprise Sector 
2.1 MSEs in Kenya 
Early research treated small enterprises as peripheral survival mechanisms whose 
developmental impact was marginal (Ongile and McCormick, 1996).  This view was 
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irrevocably changed by the 1972 International Labour Organisation report that demonstrated 
the significant employment and wealth creation potential of the burgeoning, and often 
informal, small enterprise sector (ILO, 1972).  Since the ILO report, the general outlook 
towards MSEs has shifted dramatically.  Benign neglect has been replaced by a recognition 
that the sector could be the lynchpin for improving economic prospects in the developing world 
(King, 1996).  But the shift after the 1970s also benefitted from a heightened realisation that a 
high and rising share of industrial employment was still in the small enterprise sector.  Previous 
slanting of government policies towards promotion of large, capital intensive industry meant 
that the potential for inducing more efficient use of capital and improving income distribution 
lay in more neutral policies.  MSEs also link closely with agriculture so that their promotion 
would be part of an agriculture-led development strategy.  As compared with large enterprises, 
MSEs are invariably more labour-intensive and often more efficient.  Indeed, labour-intensive 
production tends to be more efficient where labour is plentiful and capital scarce, which is 
frequently the case in developing countries (Snodgrass and Biggs, 1995).  MSEs promote more 
equitable distribution of income because they are more labour-intensive than larger enterprises, 
and because owners of small businesses are more likely to be poorer than the owners of large 
businesses.  Small enterprises also nurture entrepreneurs who may eventually expand their 
firms and move to high value adding activities. 
The Kenyan MSE sector is mixture of self-employment outlets and dynamic enterprises 
involved in an array of activities that are concentrated in urban areas but are also evident in 
rural Kenya.  There are about 1.3 million establishments employing 2.3 million individuals and 
generating as much as 14% of the country’s GDP (Mullei & Bokea, 1999).  A majority of these 
small enterprises are sole proprietorships; a third of the enterprises operate from homes; and 
one half are female-owned.  According to recent research, female-owned small enterprises are 
more likely to be informal, usually start smaller, use less start-up capital, grow slower if at all, 
have more limited access to credit and more often operate from less permanent premises and 
homes (Parker & Torres 1994, Kimuyu & Omiti 2000). 
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Through the small enterprise sector, unskilled rural migrants acquire skills needed for survival 
in the more challenging urban environment.  The sector also attracts skilled persons retrenched 
from formal sector jobs, and is often regarded as a second-best option for those unable to find 
or to keep jobs in the modern sector.  The size of an MSE's total labour force varies widely 
across business establishments and activities.  However, the two key components of the labour 
force are entrepreneurs and apprentices.  Informal garages absorb appreciably more apprentices 
and workers than the formal service sector that is dominated by proprietors.  In the recent past, 
employment growth in Kenya’s small enterprise sector has far outpaced growth in the larger 
modern sector (Aboagye, 1986).  However, many MSEs still require workers with skills that 
school leavers often lack, and therefore the small enterprise sector is not likely to solve 
Kenya’s daunting unemployment problem on its own (Ongile and McCormick, 1996). 
Although most small enterprises are younger than the large ones, their ages vary across  
locations and activities.  For the informal small businesses, the first two years are critical for 
survival since mortality rates are highest around this age.  In many sectors, lack of entry 
barriers creates severe competition that leads to the demise of the less efficient and poorly 
managed enterprises.  However, there are higher capital and skill requirements in construction 
and vehicle garages, and these act as effective entry barriers so that there is less competition in 
these sub-sectors. 
2.2 The National Sample Survey and Evaluation Programme 
This paper uses data from the 1999 baseline survey of micro and small scale enterprises in 
Kenya.  The baseline survey was based on a survey that drew from the Central Bureau of 
Statistics' National Sample Survey and Evaluation Programme (NASSEP) III sampling frame.  
The selection of clusters followed a primary stratification that distinguished between different 
households based on economic and demographic characteristics.  The Kenya Governement 
(1993) reports information about the 1993 survey.  Results from this survey were used to 
determine sample sizes in each stratum while area maps were used to determine the 
enumeration areas.  In the end, a total of 1500 households were sampled.  All adult members of 
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the households on the survey sites were interviewed using a structured questionnaire and the 
module for information on enterprises administered on households with non-agricultural 
businesses.  These procedures generated a sub-sample of about 2000 businesses whose data are 
used in the analysis reported in this paper. 
The survey gives separate categorical information about the main source of the initial capital 
for the business and any additional capital.  It does not give quantitative data on the main 
source of capital by category.  It does provide quantitative data on total initial capital and total 
additional capital, but there is no categorical data on total capital, only the main source is 
categorized.  As shown in table 1, responses to the questions, "What was the main source of 
initial (or additional) capital [for the enterprise]?" were classified into equity (family or own 
funds) or one of 10 categories of debt.  There are some ambiguities in the coding of these and 
other responses.  For example, there may be missing observations either because MSEs did not 
require any start-up or additional capital or because of a non-response to the question.  An 
important conclusion from table 1 is that relatively few MSEs have financed their capital with 
debt, and fewer still have used lenders outside the family for this purpose: just 4% of all firms 
raised their initial capital in the form of debt from outside the family; and 3% raised additional 
capital this way, although only about 25% of firms are identified as having raised any 
additional capital at all. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 1 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 2 summarizes the main quantitative data on the overall gearing rates of firms in the 
sample.  Gearing is defined as the ratio of total debt to total debt-plus-equity, where the total is 
defined to include both initial and additional capital.  There is an ambiguity in the gearing 
measure in that it is not clear from the context of the questions whether firms would necessarily 
include loans taken out in the last 12 months within their debt total.  This would depend in part 
on when the last accounts were struck from which, formally or informally, firms were reporting 
the value of their debt and equity.  As can be seen from table 2, adding in recent loans to the 
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debt total (GEAR1) makes some difference to the distribution of the gearing rates.  Fewer firms 
had a diversified capital structure according to the GEAR2 measure (excluding recent loans) 
than according to GEAR1.  Therefore we separately analysed both measures of gearing and 
compared them with one another and with the binary model of debt-equity decisions.  Overall 
though, table 2 confirms the information in table 1 that relatively few Kenyan MSEs have 
borrowed to raise capital.  
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 2 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 3 shows the success rates of those firms which did apply for a loan during the year 
preceeding the survey.  Two points are worth noting from these data.  First, it would appear 
that where credit rationing occurs, there are almost as many instances of "all-or-nothing" 
rationing as there are of partial rationing: 19 enterprises got no credit, while 22 received some 
credit, but not all they had applied for.  The theory of credit rationing generally suggests that a 
reduction in the size of the loan (rather than an outright refusal) is an effective screening device 
for lenders.  See Freixas and Rochet (1998) for a review.  Of course, the enterprises which 
were refused credit may also have had insufficient collateral or other observable charactersitics 
leading to refusal of the loan.  A second tentative conclusion is that borrowers had more 
success with co-operatives than with any other form of institutional lender.  It is particularly 
noteworthy that applicants to Rotating Credit Societies (ROSCAs) had a lower success rate.  
ROSCAs are usually thought of as having particularly good knowledge about their members.  
These data suggests that there may be important differences in credit-granting capabilities and 
policies among different micro-credit institutions.  See Morduch (1999) for a review of these 
issues.  However, we would re-emphasize that this sample is too small for us to draw more 
than tentative conclusions at this stage. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 3 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
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3. The models 
3.1 Debt v Equity 
In a recent survey of the literature on capital structure in developing economies, Prasad, Green 
and Murinde (2001) evaluate a range of competing models for studying capital structure issues.  
In the light of these models and in view of the features of MSEs in Kenya, we specify the 
following general model: 
n
k
knkn Xy εβ +=∑                       …1 
The endogenous variable, yn (n = 1,...,N), is a measure of the main source of capital of the nth 
MSE.  The Xkn (k = 1,…,K) are company-specific explanatory variables, and εn is the error 
term.  The endogenous variable is binary and is defined as: 

=
equity is capitalmain  if   0
debt    is capitalmain  if   1
ny                     
As shown in table 1 "equity" is defined as own or non-interest-bearing family funds; "debt" 
includes all other sources of funds.  Thus the model seeks to explain the debt-equity decision 
by MSEs; and equation (1) could be interpreted loosely as a (binary) demand function for debt.  
We set up our heterodox model with explanatory variables (Xk) discussed below.  Equation (1) 
was then estimated twice: first to explain the initial capital decision, and second to explain the 
decision on additional capital.  To economise on space we call these the IC and AC 
regressions, respectively.  At the first stage, we used the same explanatory variables in the two 
regressions.  We then used t-tests and likelihood ratio tests to compare the coefficients in the 
two regressions, and to test the hypothesis that there would be differences between the factors 
determining the IC decision and those determining the AC decision.  We also tested down to 
delete insignificant variables wherever possible.  Since yn is a binary variable, we used the 
probit method to estimate (1). 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 4 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
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The explanatory variables of the model are shown in table 4, together with their definitions and 
hypothesized signs in the regression.  Although most of the variables in the regression are 
heterodox in nature, many can be given an interpretation in terms of the standard corporate 
finance literature.  Therefore, in explaining the rationale for these variables and for their 
hypothesized signs, we do not attempt to present a grand new alternative theory or theories.  
Instead, we seek wherever possible to place them in the context of conventional theory, and to 
discuss the ways in which they depart from conventional theory. 
AGE is a standard measure of reputation in capital structure models.  As a firm ages, it 
establishes itself as a continuing business and it therefore increases its capacity to take on more 
debt; hence age is positively related to debt.  See Wiwattanakantang (1999).  In our data 
however, all MSEs started up at AGE=0 by construction.  Therefore a negative sign may be 
likely in the AC regression, but in the IC regression, AGE is a retrospective variable whose sign 
is uncertain. 
The next group of variables (WFEMALE, WOWNER, WUAGE, WFUAGE) are those which 
give the basic ownership characteristics of gender, participation and age.  These are included in 
the model to control for these basic characteristics of MSEs.  There is little theoretical guidance 
as to the likely signs of the specifically gender-related variables.  The estimated signs may 
provide a hint about possible discrimination, but since it is generally established in the 
literature that women in developing countries often make active use of informal financial 
schemes, such as ROSCAs, even this hypothesis is not very sharp.  See Matin, Hulme and 
Rutherford (1999).  However, it would seem likely that under-age owners would have more 
difficulty obtaining credit than their older competitors, especially from outside the family, and 
we therefore suggest that  WUAGE and WFUAGE are both likely to have a negative sign. 
EDUC and TRAIN are educational variables and we would expect these to be positively 
related to debt on the grounds that better-educated owners would find it easier to present a 
plausible case for a loan to an outside body.  This would be particularly important if the owner 
had no book-keeping knowledge. 
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FAMILYB and SOLEP are ownership variables.  The corporate finance literature is 
inconclusive about the influence of ownership on gearing.  On the one hand, agency theory 
would suggest that family owners and owner-managers prefer lower gearing to reduce the risk 
of their portfolios in the firm; on the other hand, monitoring costs are lower in the presence of 
relatively few large shareholders, and this should increase gearing.  The empirical evidence is 
also inconclusive.  See Prasad, Green and Murinde (2001). 
In the Kenyan context, OWNLAND and PERM are likely to have an important impact on any 
MSE's ability to borrow.  Indeed, these variables can be interpreted within the corporate 
finance literature as measures of asset tangibility reflecting an enterprise's ability to provide 
collateral.  However, it could also be argued that ownership of or ability to rent tangible assets 
is an indicator of wealth.  Arguably, more wealthy individuals would be more likely to use 
their own equity, at least to start a business, possibly borrowing on their tangible assets when 
seeking additional capital.  Thus the anticipated signs of OWNLAND and PERM are 
ambiguous. 
FORMAL and BUSREGLA are indicators of the extent to which the business is an ongoing 
enterprise and not for example someone who makes irregular appearances by the roadside to 
wash car windscreens or a seasonal vendor of vegetables.  As for OWNLAND and PERM, these 
variables may indicate an established business which is more easily able to borrow, or a 
business which is established because of the owner's wealth and which therefore has less need 
to borrow.  On balance though, the former appears more plausible in this case, implying a 
possibly positive sign.  
URBAN is included to check for the possibility that it is easier to obtain credit in urban areas.  
However, we have no prior beliefs about this and the hypothesized sign is therefore ambiguous.  
INC and SIZE can be interpreted as conventional corporate finance variables.  Theory is again 
ambiguous in its guidance on the signs of these variables.  Larger and more prosperous firms 
are probably more diversified and less risky (respectively) than smaller and less prosperous 
firms.  This suggests they should use more debt and less equity, ceteris paribus.  However, it is 
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also argued that large firms are less transparent and therefore their borrowings cannot be 
monitored so easily, implying a lower debt ratio.  High income may reflect high growth 
opportunities and may therefore also be associated with a lower debt ratio to reduce the risk 
that profitable investments may have to be passed over.  See Prasad, Green and Murinde 
(2001) on these points.  In the MSE contest these are relatively abstract points.  However, there 
does exist the same ambiguity as before in that INC and SIZE could reflect either ability to 
borrow (high: suggesting a positive sign) or need to borrow (low: suggesting a negative sign). 
GOOD and POOR provide more distinctively heterodox performance measures, judged not by 
income (which is not available for all companies in the sample), but by the owner's self-
assessment.  Since this assessment has much to do with the owner's view  about whether (s)he 
is likely to be able to obtain a loan, we tentatively expect a positive sign on GOOD and 
negative on POOR.  
KEEP refers to book-keeping. Proper bookkeeping will almost certainly improve the chances 
of the owner being able to borrow, and is a necessity for dealing with a formal financial 
institution.  We could again interpret this variable in a corporate finance context as reflecting 
transparency.  On either interpretation, the expected sign is positive. 
Finally we control for the general type of activity in which the business is engaged.  The survey 
provides a distinction between businesses engaged in primary activities (agriculture, forestry 
and fishing) and those in secondary (manufacturing and services).  PRIMARY is a dummy for 
all businesses engaged in primary activities.  The traditional literature would suggest that firms 
with less specialized capital are more able to borrow because they have lower bankruptcy 
costs.  However, it is difficult to apply this idea directly to the relatively coarse classification 
available.  We tentatively suggest that, in poor countries, capital in primary activities is likely 
to be more adaptable and have higher liquidation value than that in secondary activities.  This 
would suggest a positive coefficient, but one could equally well argue that the reverse may be 
true. 
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3.2 Gearing 
In the second part of the analysis we study the determinants of firms' gearing.  Gearing is 
defined as the ratio of debt to debt-plus-equity outstanding at the time of the sample survey.  It 
is important to re-emphasize that gearing as measured here is not simply an elaboration of the 
binary dependent variable in the debt versus equity regressions.  The model of section 3.1 
refers to the main source of a firm's capital.  For this, we have categorical data, but not 
quantitative data.  In this section we are concerned with a firm's total capital.  For this we have 
quantitative data but not categorical data.  See the discussion in section 2.2. 
The model to be estimated has the same form as equation (1), except than yn is now to be 
interpreted as one of the gearing measures shown in table 2, and is not a binary variable.  The 
independent variables are the same as before since we expect the same factors to influence 
gearing as influence the binary debt-equity decision.  However, it is clear from table 2 that the 
gearing of MSEs is heavily concentrated at unity and (more particularly) at zero.  Under 7% of 
the sample firms have both debt and equity outstanding according to the GEAR1 measure; 
under 4% according to GEAR2.  To take account of the heavy weights at zero and unity, we 
used the two-limit Tobit model with truncation at zero and unity to estimate equation (1).  
Maximum likelihood estimation was used.  The likelihood function and its properties are set 
out in several standard texts, such as Maddala (1983), ch. 6. 
3.3 Success Rates of Loan Applications 
In the third part of the analysis we concentrate on the 100 firms which applied for a loan during 
the one year prior to that in which the survey was undertaken.  Specifically, we use the same 
explanatory variables as before to model the determinants of the "success rate" in the debt 
market, ie. the ratio of the loan received by a firm to the amount applied for.  The general 
empirical set-up is the same as equation (1), except that yn is now the success ratio (SUCCR).  
However, as is the case for gearing, a substantial proportion of the observations on yn in this 
sample are equal to either zero or unity (78% in total; see table 3).  To take this into account, 
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we again estimate the model using the two-limit Tobit estimator, with the limits set at  zero and 
unity. 
The SUCCR equation has to be interpreted somewhat differently from the four debt equations 
which we estimate (IC, AC, GEAR1 and GEAR2), even though the postulated explanatory 
variables are the same in all the equations.  The debt equations might each be interpreted as 
demand functions for debt by individual firms, or perhaps as reduced-form estimates of the 
debt decision.  However, the success rate of firms in the loan market depends in large part on 
the lender, although as we have argued and the literature emphasizes, lenders' decisions depend 
in their turn on the observable and inferred characteristics of borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 
1998).  Thus we interpret the SUCCR equation as a (reduced-form) screening equation which 
describes loan outcomes as a function of firm characteristics.  The anticipated signs of the 
coefficients are the same as in the debt equations because we postulate that the debt decison for 
MSEs will be intimately related to their chances of success in the loan market. 
4. Empirical Results 
We followed the same broad strategy in estimating the three models.  First we estimated a 
general model, and then we tested down to a simplified model, deleting insignificant variables.  
Given the qualitative nature of most of the data, we adopted a relatively cautious critical region 
of 25% for both the t-tests and the likelihood ratio tests2.  Moreover, for the IC and AC 
equations we tested down two different routes, as we explain in section 4.1 below.  For the 
record, table 5 gives the results of estimating the general model for all 5 equations: the debt-
equity decision (IC and AC), gearing (GEAR1 and GEAR2), and the success rate equation.  
Only about one-sixth of the coefficients are significant in any of the equations, although this is 
to be expected given the rather general nature of the model, and that most of the variables are 
1-0 dummies.  FORMAL and GOOD appear to be significant in several of the models.  
Nevertheless, we can see from the likelihood ratio tests in table 5 that, notwithstanding the low 
t statistics and correlation coefficients, each model as a whole does contribute significantly to 
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explaining MSEs' financial decisions: debt-equity, gearing, and loan success rates.  We 
therefore turn next to hypothesis testing which we discuss on a model-by-model basis. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 5 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
4.1 Debt v Equity 
The first step in hypothesis-testing was to examine how far decisions on initial capital could be 
differentiated from those on additional capital.  We proceeded by testing the equality of 
coefficients on any given explanatory variable as between the IC and AC equations using t-
tests.  We then used the likelihood ratio to test groups of coefficients accepted as being 
pairwise equal by the t-tests.  To keep the presentation compact, table 6 just shows the results 
of the likelihood ratio tests.  Given the rather low explanatory power of the initial regressions, 
it is perhaps not surprising that 15 out of 20 slope coefficients will accept an equality 
restriction as between the IC and AC equations.  Only AGE, EDUC, FAMILYB, PERM, and 
FORMAL have a different effect on the IC and AC decisions.  The result for AGE is reassuring 
as we did hypothesize a difference because of the ambiguity involved in interpreting its effect 
on IC.  For other variables we had few prior beliefs about possible differences between IC and 
AC.  We then tested down from the joint model of IC and AC decisions and, as shown in table 
6, were able to delete 12 of the 15 variables restricted to the same parameter values in the IC 
and AC equations and a further 4 variables from the AC equation (EDUC, FORMAL, AGE and 
FAMILYB).  Thus the data will accept a total of 31 restrictions. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 6 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Of course, it is possible to test down by a different route, by first simplifying each equation 
separately and then testing the equality of coefficients on any given explanatory variable as 
between the separately-simplified IC and AC equations.  Proceeding in this way, a total of 32 
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restrictions are accepted, as shown in table 6.  While this methodology is likely to (and does) 
yield two slightly different models, the differences between them give an indication of the 
robustness of the underlying results.  The coefficient estimates for the two simplified versions 
of the IC and AC equations are shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 7. 
__________________________________________________________________________  
Table 7 about here 
__________________________________________________________________________  
In fact, an important feature of table 7 is that there are few major differences between the two 
versions of the debt-equity model, simplified along two different paths.  The coefficients 
remaining in the model after simplification are surprisingly well-determined and tell a clear 
and interesting story about the determinants of the capital-raising decisions of Kenyan MSEs.  
In both models, AGE appears to have a negative influence on the probability of incurring debt 
in the IC equation, and no impact in the AC equation.  Since AGE is a retrospective variable in 
the IC equation, this implies that older firms were more likely to raise their initial capital in the 
form of equity.  This suggests that borrowing has become a more viable option for firms 
established in the more recent past, in other words, that the availability of credit for small 
businesses has improved over time.  EDUC is positively signed as expected, implying that 
more educated owners do have greater possibilities of borrowing.  This is also true for TRAIN, 
although there are some differences between the two models as between IC and AC.  Overall, 
the level of education appears to have an important positive impact on MSEs' debt-raising 
capacities.  FAMILYB tends to be negatively associated with debt.  Although this variable 
could have either sign, it is perhaps not surprising to find that small family-owned businesses 
are more likely to avoid debt.  Indicators of tangibility (OWNLAND and PERM) are clearly 
important, and firms with these attributes are, as expected, generally more likely to incur debt, 
but for AC rather than IC where PERM has a counter-intuitive negative sign.  It is noteworthy 
that FORMAL contributes positively to debt in the IC equation, but not in the AC equation.  
This suggests that if an enterprise is not yet up and running, it is less likely to borrow if it is not 
constituted as a formal business, but once it is up and running, its formal status is immaterial to 
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the debt decision.  Finally, INC and GOOD are clearly very significant, with higher-income 
businesses more likely to incur debt, but firms which are self-assessed as above-average being 
less likely to incur debt.  It is interesting that these two variables have opposite signs in all the 
equations.  This suggests that there may be an important difference between MSEs' perceptions 
of their own relative performance and their actual absolute performance.  Firms which are large 
in some absolute sense, measured by high net income, may have more debt.  But, firms which 
perceive that they are performing well relative to their peers, have less debt. 
Overall, variables which are indicative of the permanence of the business, the level of 
education of the owner, and general performance of the business seem to be most important in 
determining MSEs' debt-equity decisions, both for initial capital and additional capital.  
Clearly, there are quantitative differences between the coefficients in the IC and AC equations, 
but there are no sign differences, although some variables do appear in one equation but not the 
other.  This suggests that there are relatively few substantive qualitative differences among 
financing decisions, as between MSEs' business start-ups and established MSEs.  If there are 
problems involved in start-ups, these results would suggest that, in general, they are also likely 
to be present for established businesses. 
4.2 Gearing 
Columns 3 and 4 of table 7 show the two simplified models of gearing.  It is very striking and 
reassuring that almost all the same varibles which are significant in the IC and AC models are 
also significant in the gearing models.  Moreover, all these variables have the same signs in the 
gearing models as they do in the IC and AC models:  EDUC, TRAIN, FAMILYB, FORMAL, 
INC and GOOD.  This strongly suggests that the model and the underlying influence of these 
variables on debt-equity and gearing decisions are both very robust.  There are some 
differences.  WFUAGE does not appear in the IC and AC models but it is present in the gearing 
model, and with a positive sign.  This is hard to rationalize and and may just be an anomaly in 
the data.  OWNLAND and PERM are in the IC and AC models, but do not appear in the gearing 
model.  This is more reasonable as it suggests that tangibility is a factor in the debt-equity 
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decision but not in the exact level of gearing which is decided on by the MSE.  The non-
appearance of AGE in the gearing equation is consistent with its non-appearance in the AC 
equation. 
4.3 Loan applications and decisions 
Finally, column 5 of table 7 gives the results of the screening equation for loans.  With some 
exceptions, the coefficients are plausibly signed and significant.  The positive impact of 
OWNLAND and PERM reinforces the tangibility argument made earlier.  The negative impact 
of AGE is consistent with general corporate finance arguments, although it is perhaps 
surprising that there is therefore no effect of AGE on AC or on gearing.  The negative effect of 
underage ownership (WUAGE) is also consistent with our hypotheses.  Other signs are harder 
to rationalize however: the positive sign on WFUAGE, and the negative signs on BUSREGLA 
and on KEEP.  The negative sign on PRIMARY is contrary to our tentative hypothesis, but this 
hypothesis was tentative and the negative sign may suggest that credit agencies view primary 
production as more risky than manufacturing. 
Evidently there are some important similarities and differences as between the screening 
equation and the debt equations.  OWNLAND and PERM are significant in SUCCR as well as 
in the debt-equity decision, suggesting that conventional tangibility factors are important in all 
aspects of debt decisions, from the point of view of both borrower and lender.  It is also 
interesting that EDUC, TRAIN and INC are important in the overall debt-equity decision but 
not in the SUCCR equation.  This, combined with the counter-intuitive signs on BUSREGLA 
and on KEEP in the SUCCR equation suggest that there may be an element of self-selection in 
loan applications.  If in general, some education and book-keeping are regarded as a sine qua 
non for making a loan application, the decision as to whether to grant the loan and for how 
much, may depend on other factors.  Alternatively, educated owners keeping regular accounts 
may be over-confident in their loan applications and apply for more than they can reasonably 
expect.  Less-well educated owners with less formal businesses may be more cautious, and 
therefore enjoy a better success rate.  Clearly there is more work to be done on this topic. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
Although our results must be regarded as preliminary, they emphasize four findings.  First, 
MSEs in Kenya obtain debt from a wide variety of sources especially family and friends, but 
including also co-operatives, banks, ROSCAs, NGOs, and other financial institutions.  Second, 
the debt-equity and gearing decisions of MSEs and their success rates in loan applications are 
susceptible to being understood by relatively simple models which include a mixture of 
conventional and heterodox variables.  Third, there is some tentative evidence that the 
availability of credit for small business may have improved over time.  Fourth and finally, the 
main key determinants of debt and loan screening decisions are a mixture of conventional and 
heterodox variables.  Among the conventional variables, measures of the tangibility of the 
owner's assets, and objective and subjective measures of income are particularly important, 
both in the debt and in the screening decisions.  Among the more heterodox variables, the level 
of education and training of the owners have a significant positive impact on the probability of 
borrowing and of the resultant gearing level.  Moreover, a comparison between the screening 
regression and the debt regressions would suggest that there may be some degree of self-
selection in the loan application process.  All these findings have important policy implications 
for policy makers and entrepreneurs of MSEs in Kenya.  Clearly, further research on these 
issues is necessary. 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
1. By "recent past" we mean the one year preceeding that in which the survey questions 
were asked.  The success rate data are confined to those firms which applied for a loan 
during that period. 
2. The t tests were set up as two-tailed tests, and the χ2 tests as one-tailed tests. 
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Table 1: MSEs: Main Source of Capital 
(no. of firms) 
 
Main Source of Capital Initial Capital Additional Capital 
Equity   
Family or own funds 1591 365 
Debt   
Loan from family/friends (not free) 125 28 
Money-lender 8 1 
Bank 13 8 
Non-bank credit institutions 13 5 
Rotating credit societies 12 5 
Government 3 3 
NGOs 2 3 
Formal/informal co-operatives 21 6 
Trade credit 4 3 
Other 3 27 
   
Missing observations 162 1503 
Total 1957 1957 
 
 
Table 2: MSEs: Capital Structure 
(no. of firms) 
 
 GEAR1 GEAR2 
GEAR=0 1441 1492 
GEAR=1 168 166 
0<GEAR<1 118 67 
All firms 1727 1725 
   Notes: 
   GEAR = total debt/(total debt + total equity); 
      total debt or equity = initial capital + additional capital 
   GEAR1: Loans received in previous year added to debt data 
   GEAR2: Loans received in previous year assumed to be included in debt data 
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Table 3: MSEs: Main source of credit applied for and success rate of applications 
(no. of firms) 
 
Main source of credit applied 
for during preceeding year 
Success rate of application All firms 
 none partial full  
Family/friends  1 1 3 5 
Money-lender 1 1  2 
Bank 1 6 4 11 
Non-bank credit institutions 4 3 9 16 
Rotating credit societies 1 3 5 9 
Government 1  3 4 
NGOs 5 4 20 29 
Formal/informal co-operatives  2 10 12 
Trade credit   3 3 
Other  2 2 4 
     
Missing observations 6   5 
Total 20 22 59 101 
   Notes: 
1.  Success rate of application: 
   None: credit refused by lender 
   Partial: credit granted but amount less than that applied for 
   Full:  credit granted equal to that applied for 
2. For one business, there is data on the source of credit applied for but not on the 
amounts applied for or received.  This business applied to a bank for credit, and 
for the purpose of this table it is assumed that the success rate of this business was 
"none".  However, when modelling the determinants of the success rate, this 
business is excluded from the sample.  
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Table 4:  Explanatory Variables of the Debt-Equity Model and their Hypothesized Signs 
 
Mnemonic Explanatory Variables Type of 
variable1 
Hypothesized 
sign 
AGE Age of business cont ±/+ 
WFEMALE female working owner, aged 18+ years 1-0 ± 
WOWNER Working owner, aged 18+ years 1-0 ± 
WUAGE Working owner aged 5-17 years 1-0 -? 
WFUAGE Female working owner aged 5-17 years 1-0 -? 
EDUC Owner has secondary education 1-0 +? 
TRAIN Owner has trade certificates or above 1-0 +? 
FAMILYB Ownership type = family 1-0 ± 
SOLEP Ownership type = sole proprietor 1-0 ± 
OWNLAND Business owns land 1-0 ± 
PERM Business housed in permanent structure 1-0 ± 
FORMAL Business is a formal enterprise 1-0 +? 
BUSREGLA Business is a regular business 1-0 +? 
URBAN Business is urban-based 1-0 ± 
INC Log of net income from business cont -/± 
SIZE Log of number of employees cont -/± 
GOOD Performance self-assessed as above average 1-0 +? 
POOR Performance self-assessed as below average 1-0 -? 
KEEP Business keeps a complete set of accounts 1-0 + 
PRIMARY Main economic activity is primary 1-0 ±/+ 
Type of variable: 
cont =continuous 
1-0 = binary variable, equal to 1 when the condition specified for the explanatory variable is 
met, and 0 otherwise 
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Table 5: Estimates of General Models 
 
 Probit models Two-limit Tobit models 
 Debt-equity decision Gearing Success rate 
 IC AC GEAR1 GEAR2 SUCCR 
Constant -1.434*** -3.077*** -4.343*** -6.840*** 3.438* 
 (-3.74) (-5.61) (-3.63) (-3.29) (1.95) 
AGE -0.009 0.004 0.012 0.001 -0.043 
 (-1.44) (0.65) (0.76) (0.04) (-1.31) 
WFEMALE 0.015 0.029 0.201 0.145 0.082 
 (0.18) (0.27) (0.84) (0.36) (0.20) 
WOWNER -0.149 0.265 -0.133 -0.451  
 (-0.69) (0.80) (-0.20) (-0.41)  
WUAGE -0.361 0.007 -1.059 -2.109 -2.819* 
 (-0.93) (0.02) (-0.99) (-1.09) (-1.75) 
WFUAGE 0.612 -0.333 2.118* 3.505 2.159 
 (1.36) (-0.56) (1.68) (1.56) (1.00) 
EDUC 0.139 -0.035 0.302 0.451 -0.252 
 (1.59) (-0.31) (1.23) (1.08) (-0.58) 
TRAIN 0.049 0.206* 0.308 0.392 0.031 
 (0.53) (1.77) (1.20) (0.90) (0.07) 
FAMILYB -0.225 0.110 -0.485 -1.292 -0.982 
 (-1.39) (0.51) (-1.03) (-1.62) (-1.03) 
SOLEP -0.071 0.022 -0.215 -0.573 -0.876 
 (-0.49) (0.11) (-0.51) (-0.81) (-0.95) 
OWNLAND -0.013 0.147 0.106 0.166 0.558 
 (-0.12) (1.09) (0.35) (0.32) (0.98) 
PERM -0.135 0.108 -0.060 -0.232 0.994* 
 (-1.34) (0.876) (-0.22) (-0.49) (1.91) 
FORMAL 0.355*** 0.003 0.691** 1.319** -0.300 
 (2.93) (0.02) (1.97) (2.20) (-0.50) 
BUSREGLA 0.029 -0.039 -0.152 -0.125 -0.623 
 (0.28) (-0.28) (-0.52) (-0.25) (-1.04) 
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 Probit models Two-limit Tobit models 
 Debt-equity decision Gearing Success rate 
 IC AC GEAR1 GEAR2 SUCCR 
URBAN 0.059 0.061 0.116 0.206 0.168 
 (0.69) (0.52) (0.47) (0.49) (0.38) 
INC 0.040 0.128*** 0.162* 0.242 -0.089 
 (1.14) (2.76) (1.66) (1.42) (-0.58) 
SIZE 0.075 0.066 0.275 0.509 -0.032 
 (0.90) (0.61) (1.17) (1.28) (-0.08) 
GOOD -0.202* -0.424*** -0.688** -1.197** 0.516 
 (-1.85) (-2.84) (-2.24) (-2.23) (0.90) 
POOR 0.036 -0.138 0.020 0.058 0.097 
 (0.40) (-1.18) (0.08) (0.14) (0.22) 
KEEP -0.022 -0.332 -0.353 -0.962 -0.781 
 (-0.10) (-1.09) (-0.60) (-0.93) (-0.94) 
PRIMARY 0.033 0.268 0.004 0.458 -2.504** 
 (0.19) (1.33) (0.01) (0.59) (-2.34) 
      
Std. Deviation - - 3.101*** 4.958*** 1.378*** 
   (11.47) (8.47) (4.98) 
      
No of observations 1833 1833 1727 1725 96 
R2 0.02 0.02    
LR test χ2(20) = 
37.54** 
χ2(20) = 
31.78** 
χ2(20) = 
34.79** 
χ2(20) = 
34.68** 
χ2(19) =  
20.49 
Notes: 
1.  Figures in parentheses are t statistics 
2. WOWNER is excluded from the SUCCR regression as its parameter is unidentified.  Of the 
96 firms included in the SUCCR regression, there are 4 with WOWNER=0; and in all these 
cases, the success rate is "full" (SUCCR=1).   
3. The LR test is a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are 
zero, distributed as χ2(20).  Critical values for χ2(20) are: 28.41 (10%), 31.41 (5%), and 
37.57 (1%).  Exceptionally, the LR test is distributed as χ2(19) in the SUCCR regression.  
(See note 2.)  Critical values for χ2(19) are: 27.20 (10%), 30.14 (5%), and 36.19 (1%). 
4. *  Significant at 10% level 
 **  Significant at 5% level 
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 *** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6: Hypothesis Tests on Debt-Equity Decisions 
 
Restrictions χ2 Likelihood 
ratio 
Significance
1. Impose acceptable equality restrictions between the IC and AC equations then delete
insignificant coefficients from the combined model 
1.1 Initial Capital v Additional Capital    
BUSREGLA, URBAN, SIZE χ2(3) 0.1586 0.98 
PRIMARY, OWNLAND, KEEP χ2(3) 2.8768 0.41 
WFEMALE, WOWNER, WUAGE, WFUAGE χ2(4) 3.0981 0.54 
TRAIN, SOLEP χ2(2) 1.3276 0.51 
INC, GOOD, POOR χ2(3) 3.5009 0.32 
1.2 Tests on parameters of combined model    
WOWNER R , BUSREGLA R, EDUCA, FORMAL A, 
SOLEP R, WFEMALE R, POOR R, AGE A, 
OWNLAND R, WUAGE R, WFUAGER, KEEP R, 
URBAN R, FAMILYB A, SIZE R, PRIMARY R 
χ2(16) 5.2495 0.99 
    
2. Delete insignificant coefficients from the IC and AC equations separately, then
impose acceptable equality restrictions between the simplified IC and AC equations 
2.1 Tests on parameters of individual equations    
WUAGE A, FORMAL A, KEEP I, SOLEP A, 
OWNLAND I, PRIMARY I, WFEMALE I, 
WFEMALE A, BUSREGLA I, BUSREGLA A, 
EDUC A, POOR I, URBAN A, SOLEP I, TRAIN I, 
SIZE A, WFUAGE A, AGE A, WOWNER I, URBANI, 
FAMILYB A, WOWNER A, SIZE I, WUAGE I, 
KEEP A, PERM A, WFUAGE I, POOR A, PERM I, 
PRIMARY A  
χ2(30) 14.1614 0.99 
2.2 Initial Capital v Additional Capital    
INC R, GOOD R χ2(2) 3.0299 0.22 
Notes: 
The subscripts indicate the following:  
R = the equality of the pairwise coefficients in the IC and AC models was imposed 
I = the coefficient relates to the IC model 
A = the coefficient relates to the AC model 
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Table 7: Simplified Models 
 
 Probit models:Debt-equity decision Two-limit Tobit models 
 1. Model from test 
route 1 (see table 6) 
2. Model from test 
route 2 (see table 6) 
Gearing Success 
rate 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 IC AC IC AC GEAR1 GEAR2 SUCCR 
Constant -1.825*** -2.331*** -1.843*** -2.373*** -4.561*** -7.683*** 2.087***
 (-8.75) (-10.78) (-8.91) (-10.86) (-5.54) (-4.98) (3.84) 
AGE -0.009  -0.009    -0.039 
 (-1.45)  (-1.53)    (-1.41) 
WUAGE       -2.789** 
       (-2.14) 
WFUAGE     1.096 1.600 2.045 
     (1.54) (1.31) (1.15) 
EDUC 0.127  0.129  0.274 0.536  
 (1.51)  (1.56)  (1.16) (1.35)  
TRAIN 0.107 0.107  0.208* 0.320   
 (1.52) (1.52)  (1.91) (1.26)   
FAMILYB -0.165*  -0.175*   -0.812*  
 (-1.65)  (-1.76)   (-1.68)  
OWNLAND    0.182   0.571 
    (1.46)   (1.12) 
PERM -0.137 0.163     0.639 
 (-1.40) (1.46)     (1.54) 
FORMAL 0.337***  0.303***  0.737** 1.388**  
 (2.90)  (2.71)  (2.22) (2.45)  
BUSREGLA       -0.680 
       (-1.27) 
INC 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.167* 0.265*  
 (2.98) (2.98) (3.14) (3.14) (1.85) (1.69)  
GOOD -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.715*** -1.256***  
 (-3.41) (-3.41) (-3.44) (-3.44) (-2.59) (-2.59)  
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 Probit models:Debt-equity decision Two-limit Tobit models 
 1. Model from test 
route 1 (see table 6) 
2. Model from test 
route 2 (see table 6) 
Gearing Success 
rate 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 IC AC IC AC GEAR1 GEAR2 SUCCR 
KEEP       -1.009 
       (-1.576) 
PRIMARY       -2.090** 
       (-2.278) 
        
Std. deviation     3.111*** 4.975*** 1.406***
     (11.47) (8.47) (4.98) 
        
No of obs. 1833 1833 1727 1725 96 
R2 0.03 0.03    
LR test1 See upper part of  
Table 6 
See lower part of 
Table 6 
χ2(14) = 
5.486 
χ2(14) =  
5.88 
χ2(11) = 
3.6208 
LR test2 χ2(10) =  
102.94*** 
χ2(9) =  
101.96*** 
χ2(6) = 
29.31***
χ2(6) = 
28.80***  
χ2(8) = 
16.87** 
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Notes to table 7: 
1. Figures in parentheses are t statistics 
2. LR test1 is a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the zero restrictions imposed 
in comparison with the general model are acceptable,  
3. LR test2 is a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that all (remaining) slope 
coefficients are zero.   
4. The degrees of freedom (k) and critical values of the χ2(k) statistic are as follows: 
 
Equation LR test1/2 Degrees of freedom Critical values for χ2 
   10% 5% 1% 
1 2 10 15.99 18.31 23.21 
2 2 9 14.68 16.92 21.67 
3,4 1 14 21.06 23.68 29.14 
3,4 2 6 10.64 12.59 16.81 
5 1 11 17.28 19.68 24.73 
5 2 8 13.36 15.51 20.09 
 
5. *  Significant at 10% level 
 **  Significant at 5% level 
 *** Significant at 1% level 
                                                 
